P. Kengor and P. Clark Doerner
Once the Reagan team decided that they needed to turn back the Soviet-Cuban presence in Suriname, Clark and his staff considered courses of action that for the most part had been developed by the CIA. The agency had been examining options for several months in consultation with various departments of the government.
Sources say that it was Duane “Dewey” Clarridge, the chief of the CIA’s Latin American Division in the Directorate of Operations and Bill Casey’s “right arm” for Latin America, who came up with the idea of using South Koreans–a suggestion met by mirth and wonderment inside the agency. Yet, Clarridge’s suggestion was not without merit: he argued that the South Koreans had a large fishing fleet operating off northern South America, which occasionally sailed into Paramaribo to replenish supplies.
Also the South Korean government was very friendly with the United States, and the Korean Marine Corps was tough and well trained. Clarridge proposed that two companies of South Korean Marines be transferred at sea to the South Korean fishing fleet, where they would be concealed. The fleet would make a routine stop in Paramaribo and, once darkness settled, would undertake the assault on the compound.
For support, the CIA dispatched paramilitary officers undercover to Paramaribo to reconnoiter compound headquarters, an adjacent garrison, the airfield, and the road to Paramaribo. The plan did not envisage the use of U.S. military personnel, but would be supported by a few CIA experts and would have American backing financially and politically. The Department of Defense was, however, drawing up a contingency plan for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the embassy in Paramaribo and from the ALCOA plant.
The plan, the national security advisor told the President, was to move into Suriname with a paramilitary force and “carry out a rapid operation to seize the Surinamese military headquarters[ the compound], the military garrison and the international airport and remove Bouterse”.