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The meeting took place near mid-December 1960 at Strategic Air Command(SAC) headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, attended by Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Jim Douglas, myself, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a multitude of general officers representing every unified and specific Command from all over the world.

The SIOP briefing was held on the floor of the command center at SAC headquarters. The viewers faced a high wall along which enormous panels bearing maps and charts ran on tracks the entire length of the room, perhaps a hundred feet or so. Behind and over one floor up was a glass-enclosed balcony. The generals would run SAC’s part of the war from up there behind a long line of desks, glued to telephones, peering through the enclosing glass at the maps depicting the scene of wartime activity somewhere – indeed, anywhere and perhaps almost everywhere – in the world….

At a signal from General Powers [the SAC commander] the briefer stepped on stage as it were, directly facing his audience, about fifteen or twenty feet in front of the first row….

After presenting a few charts he came to one defining the first wave of attacks to reach the Soviet Union. As I recall, these came from carrier-based fighter-bombers stationed near Okinawa. Having made this disclosure, he stepped aside.

Thereupon two airmen appeared, one from each side of the wall lined with maps, each carrying a tall stepladder. Each airmen stopped at the edge of the large map which, we now observed, showed China and the Soviet Union and probably some other nearby features on a heroic scale. Each men climbed his tall ladder at the same brisk rate, reaching the top at the same instant as his counterpart. Each reached up toward a red ribbon which, we now noticed, encircled a large roll of clear plastic. With a single motion, each untied the bowknot securing the ribbon at his end of the roll, whereupon the plastic sheet unrolled with a whoosh!, flapped a bit and then dangled limply in front of the map. A bunch of little marks appeared, most of them over Moscow, representing nuclear explosions. The men descended the ladders, folded them, carried them off, and disappeared.

The briefer repeated this performance several times as successive waves from B-52s already aloft on Headstart [airborne alert] missions and fighter-bombers from carriers in the Mediterranean and from US bases in Germany and others from carriers and bases around Japan and B-47s and B-52s launched from bases in the United States and some from bases in Europe and a few ballistic missiles( many more would become part of the plan during the next few years) dropped their lethal loads over the USSR.

Each time the briefer described an attack wave the ballet of the ladder masters would be re-enacted. They would untie another pair of red ribbons, a plastic roll would come whooshing down and Moscow would be further obliterated beneath the little marks on those layers of plastic sheets. There were little marks in other places, too, but somebody noted that a third of Soviet industrial-military strength was concentrated in the greater Moscow area, hence the concentration of bombs dropped on that region. I recall that the plan called for a total of forty megatons – megatons – on Moscow, about four thousand times more than the bomb over Hiroshima and perhaps twenty to thirty times more than all the non-nuclear bombs dropped by the Allies in both theaters during more than four years of WWII…

At the point in the briefing where some bombers were described flying northeast from the Mediterranean on their way to Moscow, General Powers waved at the speaker, saying: “Just a minute. Just a minute.” He turned in his front row chair to stare into obscurity of uniforms and dusk stretching behind me and said, “I just hope none of you have any relatives in Albania, because they have a radar station there that is right on our flight path, and we take it out.” With that, to which the response was utter silence, Power turned to the speaker and with another wave of the hand, told him to “Go ahead.”

A subsequent chart shown by the briefer displayed deaths on the vertical axis and time in hours, extending out to weeks, along the horizontal axis. He announced that there were about 175 million people in the USSR. This chart depicted the deaths from fallout alone – not from the direct effects of blast or radiation from a bomb going off, just from fallout subsequent to the attacks when radioactive dust propelled to high altitudes by initial blast begins to fall back to earth. The curve of deaths rising as time went by, leveled off at about 100 million, showing that more than half the population of the Soviet Union would be killed from radioactive fallout alone….

The briefing was soon concluded, to be followed by an identical one covering the attack on China given by a different speaker. Eventually, he too arrived at a chart showing deaths from fallout alone. “There are about 600 million Chinese in China,” he said. His chart went up to half that number, 300 million, on the vertical axis. It showed that deaths from fallout as time passed after the attack leveled out at that number, 300 million, half the population of China.

A voice out of the gloom from somewhere behind me interrupted, saying, “May I ask a question?” General Power turned again in his front-row seat, stared into the darkness and said, “Yeah, what is it?” in a tone not likely to encourage the timid. “What if this isn’t China’s war?” the voice asked. “What if this is just a war with the Soviets? Can you change the plan?”

“Well, yeah,” said General Power resignedly, “we can, but I hope nobody thinks of it, because it would really screw up the plan.”

Comments:

The next morning Secretary of Defense Gates called a meeting “to discuss the proceedings of the previous evening. The Chiefs were there, I was there, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force joined the group.” Starting with the chairman of the JCS, General Lyman Lemnitzer, each of these discussants said much the same thing: “The men had done a very fine job, a very difficult job, and they should be commented for their work.”

One person, alone, at the second session raised objections. It was the commandant of the Marine Corps, David M. Shoup, who had earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for commanding from the beach the Marines who landed at Tarawa.

“All I can say is,” Shoup said in a level voice, “any plan that murders three hundred million Chinese when it might not even be their war is not a good plan. That is not the American way.”

It was, however, the American plan. Though President Eisenhower was distressed when his science advisor George Kistiakowsky reported to him the tremendous amount of “overkill” in the plan, Eisenhower endorsed the plan and passed it on without any modification to John F. Kennedy a month later.

[John H. Rubel / Doomsday Delayed]

Een schets van de symmetrie en de bisectors van de site. De symmetrie laat ook duidelijk zien welke islamitische landen in het plan betrokken waren( Turkije, Pakistan en Iran).

Is dit ook niet de verklaring waarom men voor de cover-up een symmetrie( spiegeling) met Zahedan heeft geconstrueerd. Merk op dat ME in de bovenstaande figuur de symmetrie as van de cover-up is.

De symmetrie van de site laat er dus ook geen twijfel over bestaan dat de symmetrie met Zahedan van de bakras bijzonder belachelijk is. Deze bijzonder domme / belachelijke symmetrie cover-up met Zahedan is ook het bewijs dat het echte psychopaten zijn. Dat de oorspronkelijke positie van het HIRAN station 15 zich op / nabij het drielandenpunt bevond, is verder een bevestiging van het bewijs.

De vierde hut is gebouwd op een betonnen struktuur( zie foto Indiaan), wat blijkbaar een bunker was. Het valt verder toch niet zo moeilijk om te raden wat er in deze bunker zat( bestemd voor Paramaribo). https://www.flickr.com/photos/k_w_b_2011/8141387781/
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Voor de cover-up heeft Amerika het station 15 van z’n feitelijke positie in Brazilie nabij de Mamia Pakoro site teruggezet naar de oorspronkelijke positie op / nabij het drielandenpunt( zoals latere publikaties laten zien), terwijl de domme bakras deze station ongeveer 12.5 km naar het noorden in Brazilie hebben verplaatst. Dit is dus de missing link tussen de Mamia Pakoro site en het Tigriprobleem.

De Progress Chart van het HIRAN projekt 54-AFS-50 laat zien dat op 1 Sept 1960 het aantal gemeten afstanden 32 bedraagt. De onderstaande netwerkconfiguratie laat zien welke Venezuelaanse en Guyanese stations operationeel moesten zijn om cumultatief op 32 gemeten lijnen uit te komen.

Om het netwerk naar Suriname te verplaatsen moesten de 3 stations 14, 15 en 16 geinstalleerd worden m.b.v. de torens van de Venezuelaanse stations en operationeel zijn. Dit heeft men blijkbaar pas 4 maanden later gedaan in Januari 1961, waarna de Surinaamse stations zijn verbonden aan het Guyanese gedeelte van het netwerk. Deze vertraging van het projekt kan niet door klimatologische omstandigheden verklaard worden, omdat deze periode de Grote Drogetijd is in Suriname.

Amerika was in deze periode van 1 September 1960 t/m 15 December 1960, zoals de Progress Chart laat zien, blijkbaar met een ander projekt bezig, n.l. het aanleggen van de Mamia Pakoro site op de grens tussen Suriname en Brazilie( zie de Progress Chart)

Na 3 1/2 maand waarin het projekt stationair is worden de metingen hervat met dezelfde netwerkconfiguratie van 1 Sept. 1960( zie bovenstaande figuur). Van 15 December 1960 t/m 1 Januari 1961 komen dan 4 lijnen bij, wat het totaal aantal gemeten lijnen op 36 brengt. Dit betekent dus dat over de gehele periode van 1 Sept. 1960 t/m 1 Jan. 1961( 4 maanden) slechts 4 lijnen zijn gemeten.

In deze periode van 1 Jan. 1961 t/m 30 Jan. 1961 worden de torens van de Venezuelaanse stations gebruikt om de stations 14, 15 en 16 te installeren, waarna het netwerk zich verplaatst naar Suriname. Dit is dus het overtuigende bewijs dat de periode van 1 Sept. 1960 t/m 15 Dec. 1960 een “black box” is in het HIRAN projekt 54-AFS-50.

Er is dus onderzocht hoe we uitgaande van de 5 Venezuelaanse stations en een bepaalde netwerkconfiguratie d.m.v. accumulatie een totaal van 32 gemeten lijnen kunnen verkrijgen. Deze aantal van 32 lijnen korrespondeert met 1 Sept. 1960, waarna een gap van 3 1/2 maand ontstaat, welke ook duidelijk in de netwerkconfiguratie is te zien. Merk op dat de netwerkconfiguratie in totaal 38 lijnen bevat( genummerd). De bovenstaande figuur laat dus de configuratie van het netwerk zien zoals die was op 1 Sept. 1960, maar ook zoals die was op 15 Dec. 1960( zie ook de Progress Chart).

Onder auspiciën van WOTRO(Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research) heeft M. Hoogmoed in de periode 22 Aug-7 Okt 1968( 6 weken) een bezoek gebracht aan de Sipaliwini savanne, waarvan hieronder een beschrijving en de betreffende kaart. Er wordt o.a. een bivouac( tijdelijke kamp zonder tenten of bedekking) opgericht op de westelijke helling van de Vier Gebroedersgebergte, van waaruit de z.g. Prvate airstrip( Mamia Pakoro site) op 13 Sept 1968 werd bezocht, zonder verdere mededelingen over deze site. Opmerkelijk is natuurlijk dat men het tijdelijk kamp( bivouac) niet op de airstrip heeft opgericht welke slechts 6 km van de Vier Gebroedersgebergte is verwijderd.

22 August – 7 October: Sipaliwini savannah.
22 : by car to Zanderij (airfield), from there by air to airstrip Sipaliwini; 23 : excursion from airstrip through forest to future Base Bivouac near boundary forest-savannah on northern bank of Vier Gebroeders Creek and back to the airstrip ; 24 : installation in Base Bivouac, in the evening canoe cruise on river and collecting by lamplight ; 25, 31, 1, 2, 4 : collecting trips in the forest near Base Bivouac; 26, 27, 28, 29, 3 : collecting trips on the savannah near Base Bivouac ; 5 : trip to airstrip Sipaliwini and back, with some collecting on the way; 6 : collecting in Base Bivouac; 7, 9 : by corial to airstrip Sipaliwini, back through forest; 10: by corial up the Vier Gebroeders Creek for about 10 km, from there on foot over the savannah to Vier Gebroeders Mountain, where a new bivouac was made on the western slope in a forest-island ; 11 : trip to top of Vier Gebroeders Mountain (554 m), collecting in forest-island, in the evening collecting by lamp light in creek; 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 1 : collecting trips on savannah and in forest islands near Vier Gebroeders Mountain; 13: trip to private airstrip on Surinam-Brazil border, southeast of bivouac; 28 : trip to Paroe River in Brazil and back; 30 : collecting in Vier Gebroeders Bivouac ; 3 : trip to Base Bivouac ; 4 : from Base Bivouac to Vier Gebroeders Bivouac and back; 6 : trip to airstrip Sipaliwini; 7: by plane back to Paramaribo via Vier Gebroeders Mountain.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/k_w_b_2011/50100684627/

In een recent artikel van Januari 2019 geeft M. Hoogmoed aanvullende data( o.a. koordinaten) voor z’n publikatie uit 1969, waarin nu de “private airstrip” wordt gerefereerd als: Meyers airstrip, Mamija airstrip en Wapaisana Anotato( op internet beschikbaar)

In de periode 5 Mei 1960 t/m 24 Juni 1960( ruim 1 1/2 maand) blijft het aantal gemeten lijnen van project 54-AFS-50 stationair op 7 staan. De verklaring hiervoor is dat in die periode bewolking de fotografie vertraagde, waardoor de al gemeten stations intact gehouden moesten worden( men kon de torens niet verplaatsen naar nieuwe stations). Klimatologische data uit 1960 laat ook zien dat dit een periode is met veel neerslag.

In de periode 1 September 1960 t/m 15 December 1960, d.w.z. 3 1/2 maand, blijft het aantal gemeten lijnen stationair op 32 staan. In dit geval kan de verklaring niet gezocht worden in klimatologische omstandigheden, omdat dit een periode is met weinig neerslag( Grote Drogetijd). De Progress Chart laat dus zonder enige twijfel zien wanneer de Mamia Pakoro site is aangelegd, d.w.z. tussen 1 Sept 1960 en 15 Dec 1960.

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De onderstaande tabel geeft de gemiddelde maandelijkse regenval( mm) in verschillende lokaties in Suriname. Tussen haakjes staat het aantal jaar waarop het gemiddelde is gebasseerd. De data voor Paramaribo, Berlijn en Brownsweg is verzameld gedurende de periode 1901-1960, Moengo en Galibi tussen 1931 en 1960 en de overige stations gedurende de periode 1961-1967. Regenval in Suriname is niet gelijk verdeeld over een jaar of over het land. Een jaar kan onderverdeeld worden in 4 periodes: Grote Regentijd van Mei tot Juli, Grote Drogetijd van Augustus tot November, Kleine Regentijd van December tot Januari en Kleine Drogetijd van Februari tot April.

William P. Clark Oral History

[…]
Knott:

You mentioned Suriname in your answer. Are you willing to talk a little more about what happened in Suriname?

Clark:

Yes. We had intelligence requiring, we felt, some immediate action regarding this little Caribbean country on the north shore of South America of 250,000 people as I recall.[Desi] Bouterse, a treacherous person, who like Sergeant [Samuel] Doe liked to line up his Cabinet and shoot them occasionally, was in direct communication with [Muammar] Gaddafi and Cuban intelligence directorates. It was once known as Dutch Guiana. The Netherlands had an interest in it, a paternal and economic one, even though they’d pulled out, leaving Bouterse to his own ends. But we had intelligence that planes were actually loaded in Libya with arms and communications gear prepared to go to Paramaribo and set it up as a new Cuba.

The Soviets had planned and were prepared to open an embassy, the only embassy as far as I can recall, on the South American continent. The President determined among a very small group—Shultz, Weinberger, Clark, and Don Regan, the latter who happened in accidentally to one of our conferences—a daring plan. It was a war plan, a false one but looking very real on paper, by which, as the President said, “the great colossus of the north” would invade Suriname to stop all of this, including a parachute drop and Weinberger’s ships sailing in. So with that information, John Poindexter, General [Paul] Gorman, I forget who from the agency, and I got into a plane at Andrews Air Force Base in the hangar, late at night, having made appointments with the Presidents of Venezuela and of Brazil to ask to meet with them or their representatives three days hence. We considered this an emergency situation to stop a new Soviet foothold in our front yard, giving the Soviets a chokehold on the mouth of the Caribbean.

So we flew into Venezuela and met with the President. Our message was, “Look, either you take care of the situation, of the Soviet foothold, the Cuban foothold—” Cuba was behind it. [Fidel] Castro’s number one intelligence director had orchestrated all of this. “Either you take care of it down here or we’ll have no alternative but to do so ourselves,” and then laid out our war plans in front of them. He turned pale, and before I left his office said, “Talk to Brazil, they’re closer. I don’t want anything to do with it right now, I’m in enough political trouble.”

So we flew into Brasilia, not to meet with the President but his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and military leaders. We parked at the end of the runway, it was after dark. As John Poindexter reminded me, upon perceiving the air drop and the Navy coming in, the Chairman ran to the men’s room and threw up, he was so frightened. But the long and the short of it, our approach worked and Brazil moved in with a carrot and stick to Bouterse with social programs and stopped the Soviet incursion into Paramaribo. As far as I know, they still don’t have a Soviet representative there. So our plan worked. If it hadn’t succeeded, I’m sure we would have been called up before some Senate committee to explain why we would have attempted such a foolish thing.

Knott:

So this was one instance where secrecy was maintained.

Clark:

Absolutely and necessarily at the President’s order.

Knott:

I don’t think it’s ever been—

Clark:

Absolutely. Secrecy was maintained—from the Netherlands press there were several stories touching on it, but no one has really pressed it. When I returned to Washington, my staff met me saying, “Where in the world have you been? You’re in trouble.” I said, “What do you mean?” They said, “Well, the Baker group feels that you’re off starting World War III and you took Air Force One.” The President insisted that we take not number two or three but the plane that we took. I’d forgotten which one it was, but in any case Jim was in charge of all White house aircraft. We hadn’t asked his permission because the President told us that we weren’t to discuss this project, if it could be called that, with anyone other than those in the room. Oh, by the way, I missed mentioning Casey earlier. He was obviously involved in this.

Knott:

Was he on this trip that you referred to?

Clark:

No, Dewey Clarridge came along, that being his region for the agency. Anyway, the networks had that Sunday aired the fact that I was away on a mission without authority, that the White House had lost confidence in the National Security Advisor for doing things out on his own. Lesley Stahl, I recall, let it out early, I saw a rerun of it. So I had to assure our own staff people, who didn’t know about the project, that as far as I knew I still had a job. It all died down and went away in a day or two. But it was an interesting little project. We were gone actually just two and a half days on the weekend.
[…]

[Samual Doe was een Liberiaanse sergeant, die in April 1980 een coup pleegde in Liberia, waarbij leden van de toen zittende regering werden geexecuteerd.]

P. Kengor and P. Clark Doerner

Once the Reagan team decided that they needed to turn back the Soviet-Cuban presence in Suriname, Clark and his staff considered courses of action that for the most part had been developed by the CIA. The agency had been examining options for several months in consultation with various departments of the government.

Sources say that it was Duane “Dewey” Clarridge, the chief of the CIA’s Latin American Division in the Directorate of Operations and Bill Casey’s “right arm” for Latin America, who came up with the idea of using South Koreans–a suggestion met by mirth and wonderment inside the agency. Yet, Clarridge’s suggestion was not without merit: he argued that the South Koreans had a large fishing fleet operating off northern South America, which occasionally sailed into Paramaribo to replenish supplies.

Also the South Korean government was very friendly with the United States, and the Korean Marine Corps was tough and well trained. Clarridge proposed that two companies of South Korean Marines be transferred at sea to the South Korean fishing fleet, where they would be concealed. The fleet would make a routine stop in Paramaribo and, once darkness settled, would undertake the assault on the compound.

For support, the CIA dispatched paramilitary officers undercover to Paramaribo to reconnoiter compound headquarters, an adjacent garrison, the airfield, and the road to Paramaribo. The plan did not envisage the use of U.S. military personnel, but would be supported by a few CIA experts and would have American backing financially and politically. The Department of Defense was, however, drawing up a contingency plan for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the embassy in Paramaribo and from the ALCOA plant.

The plan, the national security advisor told the President, was to move into Suriname with a paramilitary force and “carry out a rapid operation to seize the Surinamese military headquarters[ the compound], the military garrison and the international airport and remove Bouterse”.

by H.W. Brands( 2016)

Hours after hearing the terrible news from Beirut, Reagan launched a military operation that seemed to have nothing to do with the conflict in Lebanon. Most Americans had never heard of Grenada before Reagan became president; even American newscasters required time to get the pronunciation right( gre-NAY-da). The invasion of this tiny island country in the eastern Caribbean took the American people by such surprise that Reagan’s critics hardly had time to react before the deed was done.

Reagan intended things that way. Since entering office, he had been looking for an opportunity to demonstrate his and America’s decisiveness in foreign affairs, in particular to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam and dispel the impression that the United States would not act forcefully in defense of its interests. Latin America seemed a likely place for the kind of demonstration Reagan intended. Fidel Castro and his leftist allies in the region needed a chastening, Reagan judged, and in Latin America the United States enjoyed an overwhelming military advantage over any conceivable foe.

Suriname briefly caught his eye. In December 1982 soldiers in the service of military strongman Desi Bouterse killed fifteen political dissidents in that former Dutch colony. Bouterse then made statements that struck Reagan’s ear as suggesting he was cozying up to Castro. “This must not be allowed,” Reagan wrote confidentially. “We have to find a way to stop him.” The president considered sending in the marines but decided against it. “We’d lose all we’ve gained with the other Latin American countries.”

So instead he plotted covert warfare. In the spring of 1983, Reagan’s national security team developed a plan for neutralizing or toppling Bouterse. “Based on the President’s directives at the NSPG meeting yesterday, we suggest the following possible actions,” staffers Alfonso Sapia-Bosch and Oliver North wrote: “That a Presidential emissary travel to Venezuela and Brazil this week to meet with the respective presidents to brief them in detail on what is now taking place in Suriname and what the result is likely to be, e.g., the Cubanization of Surinamese society. Furthermore this will allow the establishment of a Cuban and Soviet base on the tip of South America that will give improved access to the South Caribbean and a base from which to extend their influence with South America. Northeastern Brazil will then be open to propaganda infiltration at the very least. Venezuela will have another unfriendly country near its border.”

Sapia-Bosch and North recommended briefing not only the president of Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins, but also his probable successor, Jaime Lusinchi. “Herrera Campins feels very vulnerable because of ineptitude, financial problems, corruption, etc. By bringing Lusinchi into the loop, we would reduce pressure on Herrera Campins.” In Brazil the approach should be straightforward. “President Figueiredo must be made to understand the threat that Cubans and Soviets will present when they are on his northern border. He is an army general and should recognize the problem.”

Sapia-Bosch and North recommended other actions that were deemed too sensitive to reveal when their memo was declassified a quarter century later. But George Shultz, in his memoir, indicated what they had in mind. “The CIA sent briefers to me to outline a plan under which a force of 50 to 175 Korean commandos would stage out of Venezuela and run an assault into Paramaribo to overthrow Bouterse,” Shultz wrote. The secretary of state could hardly believe what he was hearing. “It was a hare-brained idea, ill thought out, without any convincing likelihood of success and with no analysis of the political consequences at home or internationally.” “The whole thing depended on impossibly intricate timing and a presumption that the Koreans would be taken as members of the local population. This was crazy. I was shaken to find such a wild plan put forward seriously by the CIA.”

Reagan nonetheless used the threat of invasion as leverage for diplomacy. He named William Clark as his emissary to Venezuela and Brazil. The journey was secret, but its point was clear. “Our message,” Clark recalled later, “was, Look, either you take care of the situation, of the Soviet foothold, the Cuban foothold…either you take care of it down here or we’ll have no alternative but to do so ourselves.” Clark laid out the American invasion plan to Herrera Campins in Caracas. “He turned pale, and before I left his office, said, “Talk to Brazil, they’re closer. I don’t want anything to do with it right now, I’m in enough political trouble.” Clark proceeded to Brasilia, where he met not with the Brasilian president but with the general who chaired the country’s military chiefs of staff. “We parked at the end of the runway; it was after dark,” Clark recalled. Again he delineated what an American-backed invasion of Suriname would look like. “The chairman ran to the men’s room and threw up, he was so frigtened,” Clark said.

Perhaps Clark misunderstood the cause of the general’s distress. Or perhaps the general did not convey that distress to his civilian bosses. In any event, the Clark mission failed to achieve what Reagan wanted. “Venezuela couldn’t go along, “Reagan noted after debriefing Clark. “The President of Brazil had an idea somewhat different than ours.” What that idea was, Reagan did’t say. But he added cryptically, “So operation ‘Guiminish’ is born. We’ll know before the month is out whether it has succeeded.”

De twee operaties welke Amerika in 1983 tegen Suriname( covert) en Grenada( overt) heeft uitgevoerd, waren het gevolg van het feit dat men dacht dat Moscow missiles in Grenada en/of Suriname wilde installeren als antwoord op het voornemen van Amerika om de Pershing II missile in Duitsland te plaatsen.

“Operation Guiminish” in April 1983, genoemd naar het paard van President Reagan( een cadeau van de President van Brazilie) was volgens de advisor van President Reagan m.b.t. National Security Affairs, William Clark, een succes. I.v.m. deze operatie heeft men een Braziliaanse militaire eenheid aan de noordgrens met Suriname gestationeerd. Maar waarom is JSOC dan tot eind 1983 gewoon doorgegaan met de planning( en oefening) van een carrier-launched full scale invasie van Suriname??

Een Braziliaanse patrouille op de Surinaams-Braziliaanse grens( datum ??)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CX6A2iFTsgs

In politics “carrot or stick” refers to the concept of soft and hard power. The carrot in this context could be the promise of economic or diplomatic aid between nations, while the stick might be the threat of military action.

by Sean Naylor( 2016)

A case in point was the 1981 order the Pentagon gave JSOC to prepare to invade Suriname. The huge bauxite reserves in the former Dutch colony on South America’s northeastern Atlantic coast meant that Alcoa, the massive U.S. aluminum firm, had major holdings in the country. A 1980 military coup that deposed the elected government and installed the brutal Desi Bouterse as a leftist dictator placed those properties—and, more importantly, the Western expatriates who worked on them—at risk.

JSOC began planning an operation to oust Bouterse and free any Western hostages in late 1981, infiltrating operators undercover to reconnoiter possible targets and to photograph the route from the airfield to the capital, Paramaribo, “[Det 1 MACOS] people . . . went down to Suriname and surveyed all the airfields under the guise that they were bird-watchers,” said a JSOC staffer. “We had lots of guys go down there. It was easy to get people in and out.” JSOC was confident it could pull the operation off. “It really would have been a piece of cake,” the staffer said, ““Think of a little town with the worst police force you can think of and that’s what they had.”

But the mission began to expand, particularly when it became clear that Bouterse might take and hold Western hostages in several different locations, “The Rangers and Delta were part of the recovery for these people,” said a Pentagon special operations official. “We’d have to go to several different locations and bring the expats to the airfield. At the same time we’ve got to take over the radio and TV stations in Suriname and grab the president. It was getting kind of complex.” As a result, by 1982 the operation had evolved from one that involved only JSOC to one in which XVIII Airborne Corps would have a major role.

The JSOC tactical command post and representatives from the units in the invasion plan moved to Hurlburt Field, Florida, for six weeks. The Pentagon wanted the Rangers to conduct an airfield seizure, which was becoming their specialty, with XVIII Airborne Corps 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Divisions flowing in behind them. The two divisions were “preparing to move out,” said a senior JSOC official. “I thought we were going to war.” But in a dynamic to which JSOC would grow accustomed during the next two decades, the Reagan administration called off the 1982 operation late in the planning process.

The administration remained interested in overthrowing Bouterse: in late 1983, after the CIA had considered and then dropped a plan to engineer a countercoup to topple Bouterse earlier that year, JSOC was still planning and rehearsing a carrier-launched full-scale invasion. Delta operators visited Suriname undercover on reconnaissance missions before the administration again decided against the operation. However, the prospect of a JSOC-led invasion of Suriname continued to surface for the remainder of the 1980s.” “That was always on the books,” a Delta operator said.

Events in fall 1983 ensured that JSOC’s planning effort for Suriname was not completely wasted, however. When a military coup October 14 in Grenada resulted in hard-line Marxists being replaced by even more zealous Marxists, President Reagan decided to invade the tiny Caribbean island nation. The initial plan had JSOC in the lead, with important roles for Delta, Team 6, both Ranger battalions, TF 160, and Det 1 MACOS. JSOC’s plan borrowed heavily from the command’s Suriname work. “For every target we had in Suriname, there was a like target in Grenada, so that speeded up our operations,” a JSOC staffer said. “Suriname was kind of a big joke to us, but it really turned out to be the Grenada model.”

The Grenada operation, named Urgent Fury, would be JSOC’s first combat mission, but placed the command in a role for which it was not designed: spearheading an invasion, rather than reacting to a terrorist incident. Although ultimately successful, Urgent Fury was a fiasco that, like Eagle Claw, exposed the limitations of even the most elite units and had long-term ramifications for U.S. special operations forces.